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FAMILY AND CHILD allowances constitute about 16 percent of total spend-
ing on cash transfers (CTs) worldwide (Honorati, Gentilini, and Yemtsov
2015). These programs often focus on increasing investments in children’s
human capital, particularly in nutrition and schooling, with the goal of re-
ducing the intergenerational transmission of poverty. Other old-age social
pension programs and poverty-targeted CTs have similarly targeted human
capital investment objectives. To this end, the impacts of CTs on child wel-
fare outcomes have been widely studied (De Hoop and Rosati 2014), show-
ing overall positive results on schooling and in some cases a reduction in
child labor.1 The bulk of such evidence on both conditional and uncondi-
tional CTs shows that they have substantial impacts on child enrollment and
attendance, particularly in secondary schooling, where attendance tends to
be lower in poor households (World Bank 2014).
A remaining important question about CTs, both conditional and un-
conditional, is whether their impacts on human capital investments are eq-
uitable between boys and girls vis-à-vis the use of their labor. The bulk of
studies available on CTs show no consistency on whether impacts in edu-
cation benefit girls or boys more. Gender differences in the impacts of CTs
on child labor also remain inconclusive. Differences in outcomes by gen-
der, given household access to CT programs, have important implications
for gender equality in human capital accumulation and economic growth.
Therefore, when designing CT programs to mitigate constraints faced by
households in investing in children, public policy must also consider factors
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leading to unequal investments by parents and caretakers in children based
on sex-specific preferences.
This article contributes to the literature on child well-being by exam-
ining gender-differentiated impacts on child schooling, labor, and time use
by comparing impacts on outcomes for boys and girls across married male-
headed households (MHHs) and de jure unmarried female-headed house-
holds (FHHs), and by the sex of cash transfer recipients. For the empirical
analysis, we use impact evaluation data from the Child Grants Programme
(CGP) in Lesotho, which consists of a CT provided to poor and vulnerable
rural households with children. As in many sub-Saharan African countries,
most rural households in Lesotho are engaged in agriculture, and the vast
majority of their children are employed in crop and livestock production
activities; this engagement is an important determinant of school enroll-
ment and schooling outcomes (Kimane 2006). Rural households tend to
rely on family labor and face more constraints when allocating the time that
children dedicate to agricultural activities, household chores, and school-
ing. The context of Lesotho is also characterized by the HIV pandemic,
which has affected the structure of households significantly, reducing its
adult labor capacity and potentially further constraining children’s time in
school.
CTs, child schooling and labor
Conditional CTs (CCTs) mandate child school attendance (among other re-
quirements) for qualification. There is clear evidence that CCTs, includ-
ing large programs like Brazil’s Bolsa Familia and Mexico’s Progresa (Bour-
guignon, Ferreira, and Leite 2003; Cardoso and Souza 2004; Handa et al.
2009; Skoufias et al. 2001), have positive impacts on children’s schooling,
especially among students in secondary school (see Martorano and Sanfil-
ippo [2012] for the case of Chile).
There is also evidence that social pensions and unconditional CTs
(UCTs) improve child schooling. Edmonds (2006) analyzed pensions for
the elderly in South Africa, finding significant increases in schooling and
declines in labor participation for children, mostly for boys. Examining
a monthly UCT for the ultra-poor in Malawi, Miller and Tsoka (2012)
found improved education and reduced labor among children in benefi-
ciary households. More recently, Akresh, de Walque, and Kazianga (2013)
found increased school attendance rates as a result of participation in a UCT
in Burkina Faso, and Handa et al. (2016) found increased school enroll-
ment, particularly among older children, and decreased child wage labor in
a UCT in Zambia.
A number of studies have suggested that education and labor outcomes
are influenced by parental expectations of future labor market outcomes
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relative to the current opportunity cost of boys’ and girls’ time (World Bank
2014). It is therefore plausible that these factors also influence decisions
on how to use CTs, particularly UCTs. In addition, for agricultural house-
holds facing nonseparable production and consumption decisions, the im-
pact of CTs on household production—and therefore on labor decisions
of both adults and children—are expected to be jointly determined with
other outcomes such as schooling investment decisions (Benjamin 1992;
Bardhan and Udry 1999; Handa et al. 2010). In Lesotho, child labor is
about 23 percent—usually youngmen involved in the task of livestock rear-
ing. Although no data are available for young children, the Lesotho De-
mographic and Health Survey (LDHS) shows that in 2009, about 76 per-
cent of boys aged 15–19 participated in agricultural activities, whereas
women of the same age-cohort worked in agriculture at a lower rate
(36 percent).
In relation to household decision making in child investment by sex,
child preference also plays a role in the use of CTs in child investments. Since
the seminal work of Becker (1965; 1981), economists have built on his the-
ory of choice framework to analyze intrahousehold and intergenerational
resource transmission. The findings of Emerson, Souza, and Portela (2002)
in Brazil provide strong evidence that parental child preferences may gen-
erate a gender bias in child human capital investments. They find that while
both father’s and mother’s schooling had strong impacts on sons’ education
and labor, only mother’s schooling affected the probability that a daughter
works. In addition, nonlabor income (transfers) for either parent had an
impact on sons’ school attendance, but not on that of daughters. A strand
of the literature investigating the impacts of gender-based program features
remains inconclusive on the policy implications. For example, Mexico’s Pro-
gresa provided larger transfers to households with girls to reduce the gen-
der gap in schooling enrollment (Handa et al., 2009). However, empirical
evidence has not confirmed whether the observed larger impacts on girls
derived from lower initial enrollment rates for girls or from the higher pay-
ments made to them.
Various studies have already shown that child welfare is improved
when women have control of a greater share of household resources, either
through income (Thomas, Strauss, and Henriques 1990; Quisumbing and
de la Brière 2000) or dowry (Quisumbing and Maluccio 2003), thus mak-
ing the case for women to be designated cash recipients. However, there is
scarce evidence comparing outcomes by sex of transfer recipient. The little
existing research on child sex–differentiated impacts by sex of household re-
cipient has in some cases suggested prevalent gender bias in intrahousehold
resource allocation (Duflo 2003; Akresh, de Walque, and Kazianga 2013).
More recently, a randomized controlled trial on male and female cash re-
cipients of an education grant in Morocco found that girls had marginally
higher schooling outcomes when mothers received the transfer instead of
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fathers. However, this difference was not observed within a UCT applied
in the context of the same experiment (Benhassine et al. 2015). Others
studies have made the case for a strong association between cash given to
mothers and child schooling, nutrition, and general welfare (Behrman and
Hoddinott 2005; Manley, Gitter, and Slavchevska 2012; De Brauw et al.
2014). Most of these studies, though, failed to compare these outcomes to
a scenario with male cash recipients.
The role of household structure on differences in human capital in-
vestments on girls and boys as a result of CTs has not been widely studied
either. Constraints derived from lower labor capacity are higher for agricul-
tural households, as they tend to rely on family labor, including that of chil-
dren. An important question is whether FHHs are more likely to contribute
to the intergenerational transmission of poverty, as they face higher con-
straints for substituting child labor for child education. Empirical evidence
on this question and on the social and economic factors that mitigate these
poverty dynamics is essential for sub-Saharan Africa, where 26 percent of
households are estimated to be headed by a woman and their prevalence
has increased since the 1990s (Milazzo and van de Walle 2015), due to its
changing population structure,. The extent to which FHHs are disadvan-
taged relative to MHHs in terms of poverty, labor capacity, access to land
and livestock, and lower credit and education varies greatly across studies
and contexts (Kossoudji and Mueller 1983; Handa 1996; Quisumbing 1996;
Buvinic´ and Rao Gupta 1997). These factors can also vary between de jure
FHHs, which are run by single, widowed, divorced, or separated women,
and de facto FHHs, in which a husband is temporarily absent—for instance,
because he is working and living abroad. Further, qualitative evidence from
Lesotho shows that women enact social and caregiving roles within a gen-
dered family and household context (Harrison, Short, and Tuoane-Nkhasi
2014).
In the context of sub-Saharan Africa, the age of the head of the
household is very relevant, as (due to the HIV pandemic) FHHs sometimes
consist of elderly women caring for their grandchildren. In Lesotho, house-
holds face particular constraints caused by the HIV pandemic. Starting in
the 1990s, the pandemic reduced life expectancy at birth from 59 years in
1990 to 48 years in 2000 (World Bank n.d.), and life expectancy has not
yet recovered to pre-1990 levels. According to the LDHS, in 2009, about
23 percent of adults were infected with HIV; in the same year, the propor-
tion of rural households with foster and orphan children reached 47 per-
cent. It is common for grandmothers to take charge of orphan children from
their kin, also bringing additional foster children into their care. Lesotho’s
CGP, the CT analyzed in this article, aims to help households (and children
in particular) who have been hit the most by these circumstances. About
half of our sample of CGP households are headed by a woman.
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Lesotho’s CGP
The CGP in Lesotho is a UCT that targets poor rural households with or-
phans and vulnerable children. Its primary objective is to improve the living
standards of such children—to reduce malnutrition, improve their health
status, and increase their schooling. At the beginning of the program in
2009, the transfer value was set at a flat rate of LSL120 (US$12) per month
per household and was disbursed every quarter. This amount corresponded
to around 19 percent of the median consumption of an eligible household.
Since April 2013, the size of the transfer was increased and indexed to the
number of children, ranging from LSL120 to LSL250 (US$25) per month.
Program beneficiaries are selected through a combination of proxy means
testing and community validation and are registered in the National Infor-
mation System for Social Assistance (NISSA) (Pellerano et al. 2014). As of
December 2017, 26,600 households were benefitting from the CGP, mak-
ing it the second largest social protection intervention of the Government
of Lesotho after the old-age pension. Phase 1, Round 2 of the program
was evaluated through a randomized experiment. A detailed questionnaire
was administered to control and treatment households in July–August 2011
(baseline) and during the same months in 2013 (follow-up), so as to avoid
seasonality issues. More details on the evaluation design can be found in
Pellerano et al. (2014).
Although the CGP is unconditional, programmessaging did affect child
schooling (Pace et al. 2018). Further, an impact evaluation study carried out
by Oxford Policy Management (2014) found that the CGP had a large effect
on the proportion of children aged 6–19 who were attending school. The
impact was driven mainly by a large decline in enrollment among older
boys aged 13–17 in the control group. Enrollment for 13–17-year-old boys
was 6–10 percent higher among beneficiaries. Impacts of the CGP on girls’
schooling outcomes were not statistically significant but followed a trend
similar to that for boys.
A qualitative study of the CGP found that children are commonly
taken out of school to engage in labor activities, including farm work for
boys and washing and child care for girls, especially in households engaged
in agricultural activities (Oxford Policy Management 2014). Our analysis
extends existing studies in several ways: (1) it investigates the impact of the
CGP on gender inequality in schooling; (2) it investigates whether house-
hold characteristics, in terms of the sex of the household head and labor ca-
pacity, affect the impact of CGP on gender inequality in schooling; and (3) it
investigates whether these impacts are shaped by the sex of the cash transfer
recipient.2
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Empirical framework and testable hypotheses
Our study aims to test four hypotheses. First, we tested whether the CGP
has positive effects on child investment in schooling. Positive impacts would
be manifested in an increase in children’s time in school and a decrease in
children’s time in labor, particularly among older children (those aged 13–
17). Such children tend to be more vulnerable to disinvestment, due to
their higher labor value (e.g., in agriculture) as well as their higher school-
ing costs: primary schooling in Lesotho is free, while secondary school-
ing is not. Household decisions to invest in child education depend on
marginal costs (forgone earnings from child labor and direct educational
costs) and marginal benefits (higher expected earnings as an adult as they
enter the labor market). CTs may reduce the marginal costs of education
by reducing the relative value of children’s time in work and leisure com-
pared with schooling. The agricultural household model (Benjamin 1992;
Bardhan and Udry 1999) predicts that by alleviating household credit con-
straints, an exogenous increase in income provided by CTs may affect si-
multaneously both adult and child labor. If CTs increase labor demand (say
through greater employment opportunities on the farm), an increase or a
decrease in child labor are both possible, depending on the elasticities of
adult and child farm labor with respect to income. However, if child and
adult labor are imperfect substitutes, then a decrease in child labor is to
be expected. Further, if CTs increase adult participation in wage labor off
of the farm, then child labor could increase or decrease, depending on the
income effect of the transfer and a household’s propensity to hire outside
labor. Although the CGP is a UCT, the program included strong messag-
ing about spending money on the needs of children. Hence, we expected
to observe an increase in child-specific investments, particularly in educa-
tion, and a decrease in child participation in agricultural and household
labor.
The second hypothesis to be tested was whether the CGP reduced
gender inequalities in schooling in Lesotho by generating higher impact
in schooling among boys vis-à-vis girls, as boys tend to be at a dis-
advantage with respect to schooling. The unconditional nature of the
transfer, coupled with the vulnerability of recipient agricultural house-
holds, could lead households to prioritize different needs over invest-
ing in all children equally. Therefore, we expected to observe sex
differences in the outcomes of time invested in schooling and time in-
vested in both agricultural labor and household chores by child sex and
age.
If parents expect higher lifetime wages and better employment op-
portunities for boys than girls, then the marginal benefit of one extra year
of education for boys is higher than for girls, all else held equal. If this
were the case, we would expect to find CTs having a larger impact on
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boys than on girls. However, if the marginal costs of child education in
terms of forgone earnings remain relatively higher for boys than for girls
despite the transfer, then we would conclude that girls benefit more from
the transfer than boys. Baseline differences between boys and girls in our
sample from Lesotho showed that secondary school–aged boys are more
likely to miss and repeat school and are vastly more likely to participate in
crop and livestock activities than are girls. Boys aged 13–17 spend on aver-
age one additional hour on a typical day working (mostly) on farm activi-
ties or household chores compared with girls, which is consistent with the
national-level data presented earlier. Among poor households participating
in the CGP, boys appear to be more disadvantaged than girls with respect
to educational prospects due to their participation in income-generating
activities.
A third hypothesis was that household composition determines in-
vestments in children’s schooling, by the sex of the household head and
by the household’s labor capacity. We thus would expect to find gender
differences in child investment impacts due to differences in the value of
human capital relative to the cost of present forgone earnings for boys and
girls, by household structure.Wewould also expect to observemore gender-
equitable outcomes among MHHs—positive impacts in child schooling, as
well as higher impacts among themore disadvantaged children at baseline—
as these households tend to be less labor-constrained and, with an increase
in income by the CT, are more able to substitute for child labor in favor of
more time for schooling. FHHs, on the other hand, tend to be more labor-
constrained and, in the context of Lesotho, to be formed by one adult fe-
male, usually elderly, and children, usually their grandchildren or foster
children.
The fourth hypothesis was that the control provided by assigning a
CT recipient influences decision making on households’ child schooling in-
vestments. In addition to examining differences in investments in boys and
girls by household structure, we analyzed heterogeneous impacts by the
sex of the CT recipient, who could be the father, mother, grandmother, or
caretaker. To test the assumption of unitary household decision making, we
compared child outcomes by the sex of the transfer recipient within married
MHHs only, in which intrahousehold resource allocation decisions can be
made solely or jointly. While we expected to observe gender differences in
schooling outcomes according to sex of the recipient, we did not expect to
see marked gender preferences. A global study on family preferences based
on demographic and health survey (DHS) data suggests that in the case
of Lesotho there was no statistically significant difference in girl-boy pref-
erence (18–19 percent each) and the vast majority (57 percent) prefer a
balanced family in terms of girls and boys (Fuse 2010).
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TABLE 1 Sample size
Baseline Follow-up
Total households 1,486 1,406
[8,294] [8,146]
Households with children aged 13–17 874 862
[1,186] [1,209]
Married MHHs with children 13–17 298 326
[412] [464]
De jure unmarried FHHs with children 13–17 482 435
[654] [614]
Final study sample 780 761
[1,066] [1,078]
NOTE: Numbers of individuals are in brackets. FHH and MHH stand for female-headed households and
male-headed households.
Data and empirical strategy
Data
The empirical analysis used both baseline and 24-month follow-up data.
These surveys were representative of Phase 1 (second round) of the CGP pi-
lot, which covered five districts—Qacha’s Nek, Maseru, Leribe, Berea, and
Mafeteng—in 10 community councils made up of 96 electoral divisions.
Electoral divisions were split equally into treatment and control groups
through public lottery events in each community council. Two criteria were
used to determine households’ eligibility for CGP: having at least one res-
ident child aged 0–17, and being among the poorest households in the
community.3
Our sample is represented by the cohort of children 13–17 years of age
living in de jure unmarried FHHs and married MHHs. It included children
from both panel and attrition households, and (given the two years’ lag
between baseline and follow-up) half of the sample consisted of children
appearing in both rounds, including those from split households.4 Overall,
the final sample was 2,144 children, 1,066 from the baseline and 1,078
from the follow-up. As shown in Table 1, which describes the sample size
and the selection process, approximately 60 percent of the households in
the original study had at least one child between 13 and 17 years of age.
Among these households, the vast majority (around 90 percent) were either
married MHHs or de jure unmarried FHHs.
Baseline household summary statistics
Table 2 presents summary statistics at baseline in 2011, across treatment
and control households. Given the restriction of the sample to unmarried
FHHs and married MHHs with children of secondary school age, some
differences between the treated and control groups are to be expected,
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TABLE 2 Baseline household summary statistics, by treatment arm
Variable Control Treatment p-value
FHH 0.637 0.599 0.271
Age of household head 54.464 54.627 0.865
Years of education of household head 4.130 4.015 0.584
No. of members in household 5.953 6.444 0.003
Household members 5 years old 0.679 0.812 0.035
Household members between 6 and
12 years old
1.127 1.190 0.395
Household members between 13 and
17 years old
1.373 1.360 0.767
Household members 18 years old 2.775 3.081 0.004
Maseru District 0.181 0.198 0.554
Leribe District 0.207 0.244 0.225
Berea District 0.316 0.269 0.149
Mafeteng District 0.233 0.251 0.556
Qacha’s Nek District 0.062 0.038 0.123
Household in crop production 0.741 0.807 0.027
No. of goods produced by household,
including fruits and vegetables
1.355 1.596 0.002
No. of crops produced by household 0.777 0.873 0.119
Household owned/herded any livestock in
last 12 months
0.588 0.617 0.414
Total livestock owned by household 2.673 2.909 0.452
Household operated nonfarm business in last
12 months
0.197 0.213 0.573
Individual worked in paid work outside
household in last 12 months
0.451 0.411 0.265
No. of observations 386 394
despite the randomized nature of the original design. Household com-
position for adult members over 18 and members aged 0–5 differed by
0.31 and 0.13 members, respectively, between the treatment and control
households, and this difference was statistically significant. As a result,
treatment households overall had 0.49 more household members than
control households. Controlling for differences in household composition is
likely to be important for measuring the impact of CTs on child outcomes,
as this reflects labor composition. We also found a significant difference
across treatment groups in household engagement in crop production, with
control households being 6.6 percentage points less likely to participate
and producing on average 0.24 fewer goods, including crops, fruits, and
vegetables. Both crop production and livestock rearing were important
household economic activities for the poor and vulnerable households
sampled in Lesotho, with 74–80 percent and 59–62 percent engaged in
crop production and livestock rearing, respectively.5
Table 3 compares the samples of de jure unmarried FHHs to married
MHHs and shows statistically significant differences in characteristics of the
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TABLE 3 Baseline household summary statistics, by household structure
Variable MHH FHH p-value
Age of household head 52.030 56.102 0.000
Years of education of household head 2.946 4.768 0.000
No. of members in household 6.980 5.720 0.000
Household members 5 yrs old 0.839 0.689 0.021
Household members between 6 and 12 yrs old 1.372 1.027 0.000
Household members between 13 and 17 yrs old 1.383 1.357 0.559
Household members 18 years old 3.386 2.647 0.000
Maseru District 0.178 0.197 0.506
Leribe District 0.221 0.228 0.827
Berea District 0.275 0.303 0.409
Mafeteng District 0.255 0.234 0.515
Qacha’s Nek District 0.070 0.037 0.039
Household in crop production 0.826 0.743 0.007
No. of goods produced by household, including
fruits/vegetables
1.661 1.363 0.000
No. of crops produced by household 0.993 0.722 0.000
Household owned/herded any livestock in last
12 months
0.721 0.529 0.000
Total livestock owned by household (TLU) 4.121 1.970 0.000
Household operated nonfarm business in last
12 months
0.191 0.214 0.452
Individual worked in paid work outside household
in last 12 months
0.460 0.413 0.199
No. of observations 298 482
NOTE: While baseline treatment and control groups are not balanced across some variables, using a propensity
score matched (PSM) sample does not change the main results of the analysis, suggesting that controlling for
observables mitigates differences between control and treatment group.
household head and in household attributes. Household heads in FHHs are
on average four years older than those in MHHs. FHH heads are also more
educated and have 1.8 years more schooling thanMHH heads. Other signif-
icant differences include larger households, with more members over age
18 in MHHs than in FHHs. Further, MHHs are relatively more engaged in
crop production and livestock rearing, produce fractionally more fruits and
vegetables and owning more livestock than FHHs. No significant differences
were observed at baseline with respect to nonfarm business operations and
engagement in wage labor by family members. Within household structure
groups, differences between treatment and control groups were minor. (De-
scriptive statistics not reported here are available upon request.)
Baseline child summary statistics by gender
In Table 4, we compare how girls and boys differed before CGP payments
started, particularly in the outcome variables of interest with respect to chil-
dren aged 13–17. About 52 percent of girls were enrolled in the last three
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TABLE 4 Baseline children summary statistics by sex
Variables Boys No. Girls No. p-value
Family characteristics
Age in years 14.9 544 14.9 522 0.806
Child is son/daughter of head 0.515 544 0.542 522 0.370
Child is grandchild of head 0.392 544 0.358 522 0.262
Household member is disabled 0.044 544 0.031 522 0.248
FHH 0.634 544 0.592 522 0.157
Current level of education
Primary (1–2) 0.012 410 0.005 417 0.246
Primary (3–4) 0.137 410 0.038 417 0.000
Primary (5–7) 0.585 410 0.516 417 0.044
Secondary—junior (forms A–C) 0.256 410 0.396 417 0.000
Secondary—high (forms D–E) or
higher
0.010 410 0.046 417 0.002
Brother enrolled in school 0.386 544 0.427 522 0.172
Sister enrolled in school 0.456 544 0.385 522 0.019
Dependent variables
Schooling
Household member ever repeated
school year
0.711 519 0.596 503 0.000
Household member enrolled this
year in school
0.769 536 0.820 511 0.040
Household member missed day of
school in last month
0.389 519 0.323 495 0.028
No. of days of school household
member missed in last 30 days
0.845 394 0.750 404 0.650
Labor (crop and livestock in last 7 days)
Individual worked on own
crops/livestock production
0.358 544 0.079 522 0.000
No. of days worked in last week,
crops and livestock
2.007 544 0.362 522 0.000
Time use (minutes/day)
Doing chores 60.9 487 95.6 460 0.000
In farm activities 74.7 488 8.9 464 0.000
In school 307.7 502 328.2 488 0.092
Doing homework 34.3 502 46.7 488 0.000
grades of primary school (years 5 to 7), compared with 58.5 percent of boys
in the same age group. However, in the same age category, 39 percent of girls
were in secondary school, compared with 25 percent of boys. At baseline,
71 percent of boys aged 13–17 had ever repeated a grade in school (12 per-
centage points more than girls), and 38.9 percent of boys had missed school
in the 30 days prior to the baseline survey (6.5 percentage points more than
girls). Hence, schooling among older boys appeared to be more volatile and
less favored than for girls. For rural households, especially those engaged
12 CASH TRANSFERS AND GENDER DIF FERENT IALS IN CH I LD SCHOOL ING AND LABOR
in agriculture, this implies that for a large share of older boys, the value
of their current earnings relative to the opportunity cost of schooling may
be considered greater than the value of their future earnings, resulting in a
lower share of boys in school. In addition, researchers have observed that
boys in Lesotho have lower school enrollment rates than girls and that in
the context of the HIV pandemic there has been growing pressure for boys
to support households economically (Nyabanyaba 2008).
In terms of labor and time use, 35.8 percent of boys participated in their
own crop or livestock activities in the week prior to the survey, compared
with only 7.9 percent of girls. In addition, boys in this age-group spent on
average two days per week on such activities, while girls spent just 0.36
days. However, though girls aged 13–17 spent roughly 95 minutes on a
typical day engaged in household chores, boys devoted roughly 35 minutes
less on such activities. This confirms well-established gender roles in rural
households among secondary school–aged boys and girls, which is seen not
only in Lesotho but in many rural settings.
Supporting this dichotomy of gender roles, on a typical day, boys par-
ticipated in farm activities and household chores on average nearly one hour
more than girls did. This difference was statistically significant and would
add up to a large difference between secondary school–aged boys’ and girls’
participation within a week. Hence, older boys were typically more disad-
vantaged than girls among poor rural households in Lesotho, in relative
time spent on nonleisure and nonschooling activities, and to a less extent
in schooling participation.6
Baseline child summary statistics by household
structure
We next examined differences in observed child characteristics across FHHs
and MHHs. For secondary school–aged children (Table 5), there was a stark
contrast in terms of their relationship to the household head. Specifically,
67.7 percent of children in MHHs were the sons or daughters of the house-
hold head, while only 43.4 percent in FHHs had this relationship. Further,
only 19.4 percent of boys and girls in MHHs were the grandchildren of the
head, as opposed to 48.9 percent of grandchildren in FHHs. Grandmothers
may view the value of the human capital relative to the opportunity cost
of time differently than mothers and fathers. Moreover, households headed
by a female elder may face very different constraints in terms of labor ca-
pacity and access to assets and services than households headed by younger
males.
We did not observe meaningful differences in educational outcomes
betweenMHHs and FHHs for these children. Only 32.5 percent of secondary
school–aged childrenwere enrolled in junior secondary school (forms A–C),
while most of them (54–56 percent) were enrolled in primary school (years
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TABLE 5 Baseline children outcomes, by household structure
Variables MHH No. FHH No. p-value
Family characteristics
Age in years 14.9 412 15.0 654 0.313
Child is son/daughter of household
head
0.677 412 0.434 654 0.000
Child is grandchild of household
head
0.194 412 0.489 654 0.000
Household member is disabled 0.029 412 0.043 654 0.253
Current level of education
Primary (1–2) 0.019 311 0.002 516 0.008
Primary (3–4) 0.103 311 0.078 516 0.210
Primary (5–7) 0.540 311 0.556 516 0.654
Secondary—junior (forms A–C) 0.325 311 0.328 516 0.935
Secondary—high (forms D–E) or
higher
0.013 311 0.037 516 0.042
Brother enrolled in school 0.403 412 0.408 654 0.863
Sister enrolled in school 0.478 412 0.385 654 0.003
Dependent variables
Schooling
Household member ever repeated
school year
0.670 388 0.645 634 0.415
Household member enrolled this
year in school
0.771 406 0.808 641 0.148
Household member missed day of
school in last month
0.360 394 0.355 620 0.857
No. of days of school household
member missed in last 30 days
0.900 301 0.734 497 0.443
Labor (crop and livestock in last 7 days)
Individual worked on own
crops/livestock production
0.262 412 0.196 654 0.011
No. of days worked in last week,
crops and livestock
1.442 412 1.050 654 0.012
Time use (minutes/day)
Doing chores 69.5 372 83.1 575 0.023
In farm activities 60.3 374 31.2 578 0.000
In school 313.0 382 320.8 608 0.531
Doing homework 37.3 382 42.4 608 0.132
5–7), below the school grade that they should be in given their age. This in-
dicates a lack of resources to remain in school for children in this age-group,
most likely due to household economic constraints and a high level of grade
repetition. Further, there were no significant differences across MHHs and
FHHs in regard to other key schooling indicators, either in the likelihood of
repeating school (69 percent vs. 67 percent) or in the likelihood of having
missed school days in the month prior the baseline survey (36 vs. 35.5 per-
cent). Interestingly, boys and girls from MHHs were nine percentage points
14 CASH TRANSFERS AND GENDER DIF FERENT IALS IN CH I LD SCHOOL ING AND LABOR
more likely than those from FHHs to have a sister enrolled in school in the
current year, a statistically significant difference.
Consistent with the above, we also observed a large and significant
difference in the likelihood of secondary school–aged children participat-
ing in farm labor in the seven days prior to the survey (26 percent in
MHHs, vs. 19.6 percent in FHHs). On a typical day, such children in MHHs
spent 60 minutes on farm activities, while those in FHHs spent just 31 min-
utes. However, the same children in FHHs spent on average 83 minutes
on chores, while those from MHHs spent 69 minutes on them. Children
from MHHs also spent less time at school and doing homework than did
those from FHHs. Most of these differences were significant, suggesting that
farming activities take precedence inMHHs, where livestock rearing is more
prevalent, and take up more time among male children. From the summary
statistics, labor activities in MHHs for this group of children were likely to
lead to greater substitution away from schooling relative to FHHs. Children
from FHHs spent more time on household chores, most likely because chil-
dren in FHHs were less likely to engage in livestock rearing and more likely
to substitute time on chores, including fetching water, sibling care, cleaning,
cooking, washing, and shopping.
Impact of cash transfers on child schooling, time use,
and labor
Our empirical framework was based on two fundamental assumptions: (1)
differences between the treatment group (eligible cash recipients) and the
control group (eligible but not cash recipients) can be mitigated by condi-
tioning on observables, at the community, household, and individual levels;
and (2) unobservable differences for individuals are time-invariant and can
be controlled for through individual fixed effects. We recovered the aver-
age treatment effect on the treated of the CT on child-level outcomes by
estimating the following equation:
Yiht = α0 + α1Treath ∗ Postt + α2Postt + θX iht + πZht,2011 + ρQct + δi + εiht (1)
where i indexes individual, h household, c community, and t survey year
(t = 2011 or 2013). The dependent variable Y was characterized by out-
comes for youth labor, schooling, and time use. Treath was an indicator vari-
able set to 1 if the household is a CT beneficiary, and Postt was an indicator
denoting the follow-up period. We denoted by Xiht a vector of individual
control variables, which include age of the child, whether the child is the
son/daughter of the head, whether the child is the grandson/granddaughter
of the head, whether the child is disabled, and whether the child has a sis-
ter/brother enrolled in school. Similarly, Zht, 2011 and Qct were household-
level covariates evaluated at baseline and community controls, respectively.
Household covariates included age of head, education of head, household
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size, and household composition, by age-group and sex (to control for po-
tential differences in labor constraints and sex ratio), while community vari-
ables consisted of price, wage, and shock indicators. Individual fixed effects
(δi) were used to control for time-invariant individual characteristics. Our
parameter of interest was α1, the difference in differences estimator, which
measures the impact of the CGP on child outcomes.
To estimate the discrete impacts of CTs on gender-bias in child out-
comes further, we ran the following fixed-effects regression:
Yiht = β0 + β1Treath ∗ Postt ∗ Girli + β2Treath ∗ Postt + β3Postt ∗ Girli
+β4Postt + θX iht + πZht,2011 + ρQct + δi + εiht (2)
The above equation differed from the first equation only in its incorpo-
ration of the Girli indicator, denoting if the sample individual is a girl.7 Here,
we were interested in the coefficient β2, which represented the impact of
the program on individual-level outcomes (schooling, labor, and time use)
for boys, and coefficient β3, which measured the differential impact in out-
comes for girls with respect to boys. In our impact estimates table, we also
reported for simplicity β2+β3, which represents the impact for girls.
Similar to equation (2), we examined the impacts of CTs on child out-
comes by household structure:
Yiht = γ0 + γ1Treath ∗ Postt ∗ FemHeadh + γ2Treath ∗ Postt
+ γ3Postt ∗ FemHeadh + γ4Postt + θX iht + πZht,2011 + ρQct + δi + εiht
(3)
where FemHeadh was set to 1 if a household was a de jure unmarried female-
headed one.
Lastly, for the married MHH sample, we estimated the impact of the
gender of the CT recipient:
Yiht = ϕ0 + ϕ1Treat1h ∗ Postt + ϕ2Treat2h ∗ Postt + ϕ3Postt
+ θX iht + πZht,2011 + ρQct + δi + εiht (4)
where Treat1h was set to 1 if the household received a treatment and the gen-
der of the recipient was female. Similarly, Treat2h was set to 1 if the house-
hold treatment recipient was male. For equations (3) and (4), a potential
threat to identification stems from the fact that the household structure
(FHH–MHH) and the gender of the recipient within the MHH were poten-
tially endogenous and systematically correlated with observed household
characteristics, as well as other unobservable factors. To mitigate such con-
cerns, we controlled for observable household characteristics and utilized
individual fixed effects, which should minimize time-invariant individual
and household differences. These observable household characteristics were
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TABLE 6 Impact of CGP on schooling outcomes, overall and by sex, children
aged 13–17
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Schooling
outcomes
Ever repeated
school year
Enrolled in
school
Missed any day of
school (0/1)
No. of days of
school missed
Treat*Post −0.095* 0.088** −0.146** −0.215
[0.05] [0.04] [0.06] [0.57]
Observations 2,076 2,111 2,063 1,647
R-squared 0.129 0.267 0.189 0.22
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B:
Heterogeneous
impacts by sex
Ever repeated
school year
Enrolled in
school
Missed any day of
school (0/1)
No. of days of
school missed
ITT boys = β2 −0.109 0.063 −0.14* −0.637
[0.07] [0.05] [0.07] [0.74]
ITT girls = β1+β2 −0.074 0.113* −0.154* 0.244
[0.07] [0.06] [0.09] [0.57]
Differential effect
for girls = β1
0.035 0.05 −0.014 0.881
[0.09] [0.08] [0.11] [0.65]
Observations 2,076 2,111 2,063 1,647
R-squared 0.13 0.269 0.189 0.224
*p <0.10. **p <0.05. ***p <0.01.
NOTE: Standard errors clustered at the community level in brackets. ITT = intention to treat effect.
measured at baseline, to avoid any bias caused by the inclusion of a covari-
ate that was affected by the treatment.8
Results
Gender-differentiated impacts on child investment
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results from the estimation of equation (1)
on the impact of the CGP on children. We observed an overall reduction
in the likelihood of repeating school years (9.5 percentage points), though
the effect was statistically significant only at p<0.10. Further, we found that
children aged 13–17 were 8.8 percentage points more likely to be enrolled
in school and 14.6 percentage points less likely to have missed any days of
schooling in the last 30 days (columns 2 and 3, respectively). Both results
were significant at p<0.05 and seemed driven by girls, as shown in Panel
B of Table 6, which shows the heterogeneous impacts by gender obtained
by estimating equation (2). Magnitudes for girls were slightly higher (in
absolute terms), though the β1 coefficient (the interaction term) was always
statistically nonsignificant.
Looking at the impact of CGP on the time use of girls and boys
(Table 7, Panel A), the CGP caused a reduction by 22 minutes in the time
spent on household chores for children on a typical day. This represents a
large reduction time-wise relative to the baseline average. In addition, from
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column (3), children also spent approximately 41 minutes more time at
school on a typical day. These changes were statistically significant gains for
poor and vulnerable households gaining access to the CGP. Further, as seen
in column (6), children were likely to have worked 0.6 significantly fewer
days on the farm in the past week. The results on time use and farm labor
for complement the results observed in Table 6 on schooling.
Panel B of Table 7 provides estimates of the heterogeneous impacts of
CGP on time use by sex. From column (1), we observe that as a result of the
CGP, secondary school–aged girls spent significantly less time than boys on
household chores—almost 48 minutes per day less. While the result for the
difference between girls and boys on time spent at school was nonsignificant
(column 3), girls in treatment areas spent 62 minutes more on a typical day
at school than did girls in control areas. Boys also had a lower participation
rate (–11.7 percentage points) and a smaller number of days per week (–0.8)
in farm labor. This is not unusual, as a larger proportion of older boys engage
in livestock herding and crop production in Lesotho, while girls typically
spendmore time on household chores. However, in terms of time allocation,
older girls benefited more from the CGP, spending more time in school and
less time on household activities.
Overall, the results on child schooling, time use, and labor impacts of
Lesotho’s CGP suggest gender differences in outcomes among agricultural
households favoring 13–17 year-old girls, with this group being less likely
to miss school, being likely to spend more time at school, and experiencing
less of a time burden in engaging in household chores. Despite the posi-
tive results, overall program outcomes seemed not to be working toward
a reduction in the existing inequalities between girls’ and boys’ education
among agricultural households in Lesotho.
Gender-differentiated impacts by household structure
Following equation (3), we examined whether the observed impacts dif-
fered by household structure. Our results on child schooling in Table 8
showed that children aged 13–17 in FHHs were more likely to repeat a
school year than were children in MHHs (a difference of 23.6 percentage
points). This difference stems from a statistically significant 23-percentage-
point reduction in the likelihood of ever repeating a school year in MHHs.
In addition, from the samples stratified by sex of children (columns 2 and
3), we find that the impact by household structure on school repetition is
driven by girls, as they are 30 percentage points less likely to ever repeat a
school year.
We did not find any differential school enrollment effect for FHHs for
the full sample. However, looking at the stratified samples revealed two
strikingly different results: first, girls were significantly much more likely to
be enrolled in school in MHH treatment areas (23.8 percentage points), and
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TABLE 8 Impact of CGP on child schooling, by household structure, children
aged 13–17
Ever repeated school year Enrolled in school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Girls Boys All Girls Boys
ITT MHH = γ 2 −0.23*** −0.302*** −0.151 0.083 0.238** −0.173**
[0.08] [0.11] [0.12] [0.05] [0.10] [0.08]
ITT FHH = γ 1+γ 2 0.006 0.022 0.041 0.079* −0.047 0.133**
[0.06] [0.11] [0.08] [0.05] [0.07] [0.07]
Differential effect
for FHH = γ 1
0.236** 0.324** 0.193 −0.004 −0.285*** 0.306***
[0.10] [0.16] [0.13] [0.07] [0.10] [0.10]
Observations 2,076 1,014 1,062 2,111 1,028 1,083
R-squared 0.14 0.244 0.253 0.273 0.365 0.442
Missed any day (0/1) No. of days of school missed
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
All Girls Boys All Girls Boys
ITT MHH = γ 2 −0.119 −0.292** 0.075 −0.394 0.942* −0.11
[0.08] [0.13] [0.12] [0.59] [0.50] [1.07]
ITT FHH = γ 1+γ 2 −0.147** −0.097 −0.205** −0.232 0.259 −0.388
[0.07] [0.11] [0.09] [0.56] [0.44] [0.73]
Differential effect
for FHH = γ 1
−0.028 0.196 −0.28** 0.162 −0.683 −0.278
[0.09] [0.15] [0.14] [0.55] [0.54] [1.31]
Observations 2,063 1,006 1,057 1,647 842 805
R-squared 0.196 0.318 0.32 0.23 0.375 0.465
*p <0.10. **p <0.05. ***p <0.01.
NOTE: Standard errors clustered at the community level in brackets. ITT = intention to treat effect. MHH =
married male-headed households; FHH = de jure unmarried female-headed households
while the decline for FHHs was not statistically significant, this difference
translates into an effect of –28.5 percentage points. The opposite result was
observed for boys: those inMHHs were 17 percentage points less likely to be
enrolled, while those in FHHs were 13 percentage points more likely. Thus,
there was a 30.6-percentage-point differential impact in FHHs among boys.
A similar story emerged if we considered as a dependent variable whether
children had missed any school day in the last 30 days. Overall, the impact
was significant only for children in FHHs. However, when we looked at
the samples by the sex of the child, girls in MHHs were much less likely
to miss school (a difference of 29.2 percentage points), while boys in FFHs
were more likely to do so (a difference of –20.5 percentage points). The
differential effect was statistically significant only for the sample of boys.
The results on schooling indicate that girls in MHHs are likely to gain from
access to the CGP in Lesotho. However, in FHHs, we observed some benefits
to the CGP concentrated among boys. That is, in MHHs, the CGP results in
a bias that favors girls, while boys in FHHs are more likely to attain positive
school enrollment outcomes as a result of the transfer.
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TABLE 9 Impact of CGP on time use (minutes/day), by household structure,
children aged 13–17
Chores Family labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Girls Boys All Girls Boys
ITT MHH = γ 2 −34.47* −78.646** −7.542 14.013 5.329 −23.76
[18.84] [35.23] [22.72] [24.80] [14.94] [43.67]
ITT FHH = γ 1+γ 2 −7.613 −12.312 −4.648 −6.582 5.42 −20.12
[15.00] [26.69] [14.41] [18.94] [10.49] [35.32]
Differential effect
for FHH = γ 1
26.856 66.335* 2.894 −20.595 0.09 3.64
[22.20] [34.82] [24.80] [28.36] [17.14] [46.79]
Observations 1,976 960 1,016 1,983 967 1,016
R-squared 0.183 0.341 0.305 0.162 0.263 0.274
At school Homework
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
All Girls Boys All Girls Boys
ITT MHH = γ 2 34.517 90.617* −62.136 17.435 30.747* −1.736
[28.19] [51.69] [40.17] [10.79] [16.70] [12.30]
ITT FHH = γ 1+γ 2 39.657 52.511 1.629 −2.955 −8.818 −1.225
[28.53] [42.98] [39.22] [9.10] [15.49] [10.19]
Differential effect for
FHH = γ 1
5.139 −38.106 63.765 −20.39 −39.565* 0.512
[39.00] [64.46] [45.95] [13.56] [21.48] [14.64]
Observations 2,048 1,004 1,044 2,048 1,004 1,044
R-squared 0.187 0.304 0.325 0.198 0.371 0.271
*p <0.10. **p <0.05. ***p <0.01.
NOTE: Standard errors clustered at the community level in brackets. ITT = intention to treat effect. MHH =
married male-headed households, FHH = de jure unmarried female-headed households
Similar results can be seen in Table 9, where we analyzed the impacts
of the CGP on girls’ and boys’ time use by household structure. Overall, we
found no differential impacts across FHHs and MHHs. However, the coeffi-
cients from the stratified samples indicated that girls aged 13–17 in MHHs
were less likely to engage in household chores, by almost 80 minutes in
a typical day. This translated into a 66-minute difference in time spent by
girls in FHHs in doing chores when compared with those in MHHs. Despite
the lack of a significant difference in the pooled regression, in MHHs girls
spent more time at school (90 minutes) and doing homework (30 minutes),
though only the latter outcome shows a significant negative differential ef-
fect for FHHs (–39 minutes, but significant only at p<0.10). These results
complement the impacts of CGP on schooling outcomes across household
structures observed for secondary school aged–children.
Finally, looking at the impacts of the CGP on participation in farm la-
bor by household structure (Table 10), we could find no differential impact
on FHHs, either in the pooled regressions or in the stratified samples. A sig-
nificant reduction in the number of days worked in MHHs was driven by
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TABLE 10 Heterogeneous impacts on farm labor (last 7 days), by household
structure, children aged 13–17
Worked (0/1) No. of days worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Girls Boys All Girls Boys
ITT MHH = γ 2 −0.089 −0.007 −0.153 −0.707* −0.034 −1.146*
[0.07] [0.10] [0.13] [0.41] [0.45] [0.68]
ITT FHH = γ 1+γ 2 −0.09 −0.104 −0.117 −0.547 −0.209 −0.874
[0.06] [0.09] [0.09] [0.36] [0.49] [0.57]
Differential effect for
FHH = γ 1
−0.001 −0.097 0.036 0.16 −0.175 0.272
[0.09] [0.11] [0.15] [0.54] [0.54] [0.90]
Observations 2,141 1,045 1,096 2,141 1,045 1,096
R-squared 0.167 0.271 0.235 0.151 0.196 0.241
*p <0.10. **p <0.05. ***p <0.01.
NOTE: Standard errors clustered at the community level in brackets. ITT = intention to treat effect. MHH =
married male-headed households, FHH = de jure unmarried female-headed households
the sample of boys, who at the baseline were in a disadvantaged position
compared with girls.
Gender-differentiated impacts in MHHs, by sex of
transfer recipient
To assess the influence of potential gender bias by the transfer recipient
toward boys or girls, we analyzed the impacts of the CGP within the sub-
sample of married MHHs.9 In Table 11, φ1 is the coefficient associated with
the interaction between the indicator for a female recipient and the time
dummy (Treat1Post) and denotes the CGP impact for households with fe-
male recipients; φ2 is the coefficient for the interaction between the indica-
tor for a male recipient and the time dummy (Treat2Post) and isolates the
CGP impact for households with male recipients.10 From columns (1) to (3),
both girls and boys in recipient households were significantly less likely to
have ever repeated a school year, though the impact was greater for girls in
households with a female recipient and for boys in households with a male
recipient. With respect to school enrollment (columns 4 to 6), the negative
impact observed for boys in Table 8 was magnified when the cash recipient
was a male. Interestingly, the positive impact observed for girls was statis-
tically significant only when the recipient was a male. This latter finding is
mirrored by a similar result in the probability of missing any school day in
the last 30 days, as the reduction was significant only for the male recipient
interaction term.
Table 12 distinguishes the impact of CTs on child time use outcomes by
sex of the recipient within the subsample of married MHHs. Columns (1)
to (3) indicate that participation in household chores was significantly re-
duced among children aged 13–17 in households with a female recipient.
However, this reduction was highly significant only for the sample of boys
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TABLE 11 Heterogeneous impacts on schooling, by sex of the recipient in
MHHs, children aged 13–17
Ever repeated a school year Enrolled in school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Girls Boys All Girls Boys
φ1 (female recipient) −0.285*** −0.513*** −0.341** 0.022 0.079 −0.353***
[0.10] [0.15] [0.17] [0.08] [0.17] [0.12]
φ2 (male recipient) −0.338*** −0.42*** −0.44** 0.152** 0.254* −0.496***
[0.09] [0.10] [0.21] [0.07] [0.14] [0.14]
Observations 757 406 351 777 415 362
R-squared 0.422 0.55 0.658 0.409 0.559 0.736
Missed any day (0/1) No. of days of school missed
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
All Girls Boys All Girls Boys
φ1 (female recipient) −0.165* −0.324 0.026 −0.903** 0.662 −7.522***
[0.09] [0.22] [0.12] [0.43] [0.79] [0.00]
φ2 (male recipient) −0.204** −0.4** 0.278* −1.529** −0.269 −11.418***
[0.09] [0.17] [0.17] [0.66] [1.38] [0.00]
Observations 763 407 356 597 337 260
R-squared 0.325 0.523 0.69 0.401 0.514 0.973
*p <0.10. **p <0.05. ***p <0.01.
NOTE: Standard errors clustered at the community level in brackets.
TABLE 12 Heterogeneous impacts on time use (minutes/day), by sex of
recipient in MHHs, children aged 13–17
Chores Family labor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Girls Boys All Girls Boys
φ1 (female recipient) −35.089* −23.994 −72.879** 30.461 19.325 45.969
[20.82] [29.14] [29.40] [24.48] [17.95] [59.74]
φ2 (male recipient) −24.399 −53.054* −15.634 -9.977 0.844 -19.206
[16.92] [29.19] [19.06] [26.73] [14.12] [60.29]
Observations 732 391 341 733 393 340
R-squared 0.21 0.282 0.305 0.237 0.224 0.276
At school Homework
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
All Girls Boys All Girls Boys
φ1 (female recipient) −17.645 −30.412 −17.985 14.385 20.916 4.53
[30.46] [52.05] [46.24] [10.50] [17.00] [14.87]
φ2 (male recipient) 28.395 22.342 6.166 20.799* 4.316 28.321**
[26.83] [49.09] [33.55] [10.64] [15.18] [12.68]
Observations 749 403 346 749 403 346
R-squared 0.261 0.335 0.395 0.235 0.305 0.379
*p <0.10. **p <0.05. ***p <0.01.
NOTE: Standard errors clustered at the community level in brackets.
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TABLE 13 Heterogeneous impacts on farm labor, by sex of recipient in
MHHs, children aged 13–17
worked (0/1) # days worked
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Girls Boys All Girls Boys
φ1 (female recipient) −0.056 −0.039 0.028 −0.541 −0.11 −0.511
[0.09] [0.10] [0.15] [0.50] [0.49] [0.90]
φ2 (male recipient) −0.065 0.053 −0.193 −0.307 0.459 −1.03
[0.09] [0.10] [0.15] [0.50] [0.45] [0.88]
Observations 784 418 366 784 418 366
R-squared 0.297 0.199 0.221 0.302 0.206 0.204
*p <0.10. **p <0.05. ***p <0.01.
NOTE: Standard errors clustered at the community level in brackets.
(–72minutes). We also found that girls inMHH spent less time (53minutes)
in chores when the CT recipient wasmale. Further results distinguishing be-
tween male and female CT recipients were weak for most of the other time
use outcomes. In columns 10 and 12, we found that the increase in time
spent doing homework was concentrated in households where men were
the recipients of CTs. Lastly, Table 13 showed no significant impact of the
sex of the cash recipient on aspects of farm labor.
Discussion and conclusion
In this article, we investigated gender differences in household child in-
vestment behavior using data from a randomized controlled trial aimed at
measuring the impacts of the Lesotho Child Grants Program, a CT program
directed to poor households with children. The analysis focused on house-
holds with children of secondary school age, as in Lesotho access to pri-
mary school is almost universal. In addition to observing impacts between
boys and girls, we sought to examinewhether gender-differentiated impacts
varied according household structure. This exercise furthered understand-
ing on the different constraints experienced by different types of households
and their decision making as a result of cash transfers. We therefore ana-
lyzed impacts in child investments by married MHHs and de jure unmarried
FHHs, the latter having lower labor capacity constrained by older status of
the head and a higher household dependency ratio. Finally, we explored
the relationship between gender-differentiated impacts and potential sex
bias, as determined by who in the household receives the cash. This aimed
to deepen the evidence for or against the idea of child preference by sex,
particularly in schooling. Our hypothesis was that in the case of Lesotho’s
CGP, household structure—and therefore the household’s capacities and
constraints—plays a role in influencing observed gender-differentiated im-
pacts on child investments, rather than gender bias.
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First, we found that the CGP increased existing secondary school–aged
girls’ advantage, as these girls in treatment households benefited signif-
icantly more from increased schooling enrollment, fewer missed days of
school, and time use activities shifting away from household chores. Among
secondary school–age boys, however, we noted a significant decline of al-
most one day less spent working in crop production or livestock activities as
a result of the transfer. These results are not unusual, as a larger proportion
of older boys engage in livestock herding and crop production in Lesotho,
while girls typically spend more time on household chores. However, these
girls benefited more than boys from the CGP, considering that girls were
already in an advantaged position before the introduction of the transfer.
From a theoretical perspective, this could first suggest that parental
preferences favor the allocation of resources toward girls. It could also be
that the current opportunity cost of boys’ time, despite the CT, is perceived
as being higher than the future benefit of human capital accumulation, and
that this difference for boys exceeds that of girls. If households rely more on
boys for sustaining current agricultural incomes (which is suggested in other
work in Lesotho), it is plausible that the size of the transfer was not large
enough to increase secondary school–aged boys’ participation in schooling
but was sufficiently large to incentivize girls to attend school.
Second, we found that in de jure unmarried FHHs, the CGP improved
schooling outcomes for secondary school–aged boys. For girls in this cohort,
the treatment impacts were not as strong as among boys. We hypothesize
that heads of FHHs, where a larger proportion of the children are grandchil-
dren as opposed to sons or daughters of the head, may respond differently
when accessing additional income through the CT and may have different
preferences on gender and child education. One hypothesis is potential bias
toward males reflected by positive impacts in boys’ education vis-à-vis fu-
ture prospects. Given the ex ante disadvantages for boys, this is a positive
outcome of the program. Adding to this, investment in agricultural activi-
ties by FHHs—brought about by a reduction in liquidity constraints—may
have led to an increase in adult agricultural labor participation. In this situ-
ation, girls’ time may still be required for household chores.
InMHHs, girls benefitedmuchmore in terms of schooling and time use
outcomes than did boys in the treatment evaluation. This would suggest
that in MHHs, where a larger proportion of secondary school–aged boys
engaged in crop production and livestock activities, the opportunity cost of
boys’ time may be still too high relative to that of girls, despite their access
to the transfer.
Finally, much of the empirical and theoretical literature supports tar-
geting women as transfer recipients to improve household well-being, such
as children’s health and educational outcomes. Our research showing that
women spent in more “family-friendly” ways is primarily based on the as-
sumption that women systematically differ from men in their preferences
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for types of expenditures or for the welfare of particular family members.
However, when transfers are allocated to women rather than to men in
a household, other factors beyond preferences and incentives determine
whether differences in outcomes related to well-being will actually be real-
ized (Yoong, Rabinovich, and Diepeveen 2012). These include, for example,
differences in bargaining power over allocation of resources, under the as-
sumption that intrahousehold bargaining is not fully cooperative, or differ-
ences in income-generating ability, for which women may face many other
constraints (such as social restrictions on occupational type, or a relative
lack of training) that result in lower returns for the transfer. Our analysis
suggests that child investment, particularly for girls, may not be driven by
the sex of the transfer recipient, contrary to previous literature. More plau-
sibly, rather than male or female preference, it is the household structure
and constraints that determine these differentiated effects.
For program design, our findings suggest that an undifferentiated CT
for different types of households should at least include gender-specificmes-
saging to promote boys’ and girls’ equal benefit in schooling. In addition,
higher transfer levels and other mechanisms that could facilitate household
access to agricultural laborwould be required for children to be able to spend
more time at school and increase their educational level.
Notes
The research presented in this article has
been carried out under the auspices of
the “From Protection to Production” (PtoP)
project, a collaborative effort of the United
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the
United Kingdom Department for Interna-
tional Development (DFID) and the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Na-
tions (FAO). The project has received fund-
ing from the DFID Research and Evidence
Division, the European Union through the
“Improved Global Governance for Hunger
Reduction Programme” and the FAO Reg-
ular Fund. PtoP is also part of a larger
effort, the Transfer Project, together with
UNICEF, Save the Children and the Univer-
sity of North Carolina, to support the im-
plementation of impact evaluations of cash
transfer programmes in sub-Saharan Africa
(https://transfer.cpc.unc.edu/). We are in-
debted to both the Ministry of Social Devel-
opment and UNICEF Lesotho staff for the
provision of the data used in this analysis
and to the European Union that generously
supported the Child Grants Programme and
the data collected for its evaluation under the
project “Support to Lesotho HIV and Aids Re-
sponse: Empowerment of Orphans and Vul-
nerable Children”. We would like to thank
also: two anonymous reviewers and the jour-
nal editor, who have provided excellent com-
ments and significantly contributed to the
improvement of the article; Miguel Niño-
Zarazúa, Katia Covarrubias and Fabio Veras
Soares for a technical review of a previous
draft of the paper; Borja Miguelez for help
with the interpretation of results; Ervin Prifti,
Maja Jakobsen, Marta Moratti, Jack Willis
and the late Joshua Dewbre for useful discus-
sion and collaboration in data collection and
analysis efforts; the team from Sechaba Con-
sultants leading the fieldwork for data collec-
tion at both baseline and follow-up; partici-
pants at the UNU-WIDER Symposium on the
Political Economy of Social Protection in De-
velopment Countries held in Mexico City for
their suggestions. All mistakes and omissions
are our own.
1 With the term “child labor,” inter-
national organizations often define work
that deprives children of their childhood,
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their potential, and their dignity and that
is harmful to their physical and mental
development. Engagement of children in
labor activities can be difficult and demand-
ing, hazardous, and even morally reprehen-
sible. With the available survey instrument
used to collect the data for this study, it is
impossible to disentangle the many kinds of
work children do. For this reason, in this
study, we use interchangeably such terms as
child labor, child work, or engagement of
children in family farming or wage labor.
2 The results for primary school–aged
children (6–12) are not presented in this arti-
cle, due in part to space constraints and to the
lack of strong statistical significance in results
for children in this age-group.
3 For more details about the identifica-
tion process of the poorest households, see
Pellerano et al. 2014.
4 The purpose of the survey was to track
children. In some cases, the children of one
household from baseline may have split into
multiple households by the time of follow-
up. (Additional details and discussion can be
found in Pellerano et al. 2014.)
5 The results presented here do not
use Propensity Score Matching (PSM) tech-
niques, like reweighting for the propensity
score, since impact estimates are virtually un-
changed. This suggests that controlling for
observables is sufficient to mitigate differ-
ences between control and treatment groups.
Results are available from the authors on
request.
6 A prior draft of this article included
baseline statistics and all results for younger
children aged 6–12. However, due to space
limitations and the lack of strong results for
this age-group, these results were not in-
cluded in this version of the analysis. These
results are available upon request from the
authors.
7 Note that the “Girl” indicator and the
“FemHead” indicator (from the subsequent
equation), as well as the treatment indicator,
were omitted due to individual fixed effects.
8 Controlling for time-varying house-
hold characteristics brings about only minor
and negligible changes to impact estimates.
Further, we did Hausman tests for overiden-
tifying restrictions, and fixed-effects mod-
els were always preferred to random-effects
models.
9 We cannot test this potential gender
bias by the gender of cash recipients in FHHs,
since we selected those households where
women were de jure single. Hence, the over-
whelming majority of women received the
cash. There were few spare cases in which
a man in these households received the
transfer (a brother or a child), though the
econometric analysis would lack statistical
power.
10 The sample size in the heterogene-
ity analysis by the gender of the recipient is
smaller than the overall MHH sample, as 10
percent of the data on sex of cash recipients
are missing.
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